# [***82 FR 50181***](https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=administrative-codes&id=urn:contentItem:5PV5-SST0-006W-855X-00000-00&context=)

Vol. 82, No. 208, Monday, October 30, 2017

Notices

**Reporter**

82 FR 50181 \*

***Federal Register* > *2017* > *October* > *Monday, October 30, 2017* > *Notices* > *SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC)***

**Title:** **Self-Regulatory Organizations; MIAX PEARL, LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change To Amend the MIAX PEARL Fee Schedule**

**Agency**

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC)

**Identifier:** **[Release No. 34-81932; File No. SR-PEARL-2017-35]**

**Text**

October 24, 2017.

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Act") n1 and Rule 19b 4 thereunder, n2 notice is hereby given that on October 11, 2017, MIAX PEARL, LLC ("MIAX PEARL" or "Exchange") filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") the proposed rule change as described in Items I and II below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.

n1 [*15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1)*](https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=statutes-legislation&id=urn:contentItem:4YF7-GTY1-NRF4-41M9-00000-00&context=).

n2 [*17 CFR 240.19b-4*](https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=administrative-codes&id=urn:contentItem:5NBM-FN20-008G-Y15M-00000-00&context=).

**I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rule Change**

The Exchange is filing a proposal to amend the MIAX PEARL Fee Schedule (the "Fee Schedule") to adopt a fee for the sale of certain historical market data.

The text of the proposed rule change is available on the Exchange's Web site at [*http://www.miaxoptions.com/rule-filings/pearl*](http://www.miaxoptions.com/rule-filings/pearl) at MIAX PEARL's principal office, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.

**II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change**

In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such statements.

*A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change*

1. Purpose

The Exchange proposes to amend its Fee Schedule to adopt a fee for the sale of certain historical market data.

The historical market data that the Exchange proposes to sell provides information about the past activity of all option products traded on the Exchange for each trading session conducted during a particular calendar month. The data is intended to enhance the user's ability to analyze option trade and volume data, evaluate historical trends in the trading activity of a particular option product, and enable the testing of trading models and analytical strategies. Specifically, the historical market data that the Exchange proposes to sell includes all data that is captured and disseminated on the following proprietary MIAX PEARL data feeds, on a T+1 basis: MIAX PEARL Top of Market ("ToM"); and MIAX PEARL Liquidity Feed ("PLF") ("Historical Market Data"). All such proprietary MIAX PEARL data feeds that, on a T+1 basis, comprise the Historical Market Data are described on the Exchange's Fee Schedule. n3

n3 *See* MIAX PEARL Fee Schedule, Section 6.

ToM provides real-time, ultra-low latency updates of the MIAX PEARL Best Bid or Offer, or PBBO, n4 the last sale with trade price, size and condition, last sale cancellations, listed series updates, system state, and underlying trading state. n5 PLF provides real-time, ultra-low latency updates of new simple orders added to the MIAX PEARL order book, updates to simple orders resting on the MIAX PEARL order book, listed series updates, System n6 state, and underlying trading state. n7

n4 The term "PBBO" means the best bid or offer on the PEARL Exchange. *See* Exchange Rule 100. *See also* Exchange Rule 506(d).

n5 *See* Securities Exchange Act Release No. 79913 (February 1, 2017), [*82 FR 9617*](https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=administrative-codes&id=urn:contentItem:5MTN-YPT0-006W-800C-00000-00&context=) (February 7, 2017) (SR-PEARL-2017-01) (Establishing MIAX PEARL ToM and PLF Data Products).

n6 The term "System" means the automated trading system used by the Exchange for the trading of securities. *See* Exchange Rule 100.

n7 *See* supra note 5.

MIAX PEARL will only assess the fee for Historical Market Data on a user (whether Member or Non-Member) that specifically requests such Historical Market Data. Historical Market Data will be uploaded onto an Exchange-provided device. The amount of the fee is $ 500, and it will be assessed on a per device basis. Each device shall have a maximum storage capacity of 8 Terabytes and will be configured to include data for both MIAX Options and MIAX PEARL. Users may request up to six months of Historical Market Data per device, subject to the device's storage capacity. Historical Market Data is available from August 1, 2017 to the present (always on a T+1 basis), however only the most recent six months of Historical Market Data shall be available for purchase from the request date. Historical Market Data usage is restricted to internal use only, and thus may not be distributed to any third-party.

The Exchange notes that this filing is substantially similar to a companion MIAX Options filing n8 establishing a fee for historical market data on its exchange.

n8 *See* SR-MIAX-2017-42 (filed on October 11, 2017).

2. Statutory Basis

The Exchange believes that its proposal to amend its Fee Schedule is consistent with Section 6(b) of the Act n9 in general, and furthers the objectives of Section 6(b)(4) of the Act, n10 in particular, in that it is an equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees and other charges among Exchange members and issuers and other persons using its facilities. The proposal provides for the equitable allocation of reasonable fees and other charges among Exchange **[\*50182]** members and other persons using its facilities because all persons and entities will have equal access to Historical Market Data.

n9 [*15 U.S.C. 78f(b)*](https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=statutes-legislation&id=urn:contentItem:4YF7-GPC1-NRF4-4309-00000-00&context=).

n10 [*15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4)*](https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=statutes-legislation&id=urn:contentItem:4YF7-GPC1-NRF4-4309-00000-00&context=).

The Exchange believes the proposed fees are a reasonable allocation of its costs and expenses among its Members and other persons using its facilities since it is recovering the costs associated with distributing such data. Access to the Exchange is provided on fair and non-discriminatory terms. The Exchange believes the proposed fees are equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because the fee level results in a reasonable and equitable allocation of fees amongst users for similar services. Moreover, the decision as to whether or not to purchase Historical Market Data is entirely optional to all users. Potential purchasers are not required to purchase the Historical Market Data, and the Exchange is not required to make the Historical Market Data available. Purchasers may request the data at any time or may decline to purchase such data. The allocation of fees among users is fair and reasonable because, if the market deems the proposed fees to be unfair or inequitable, firms can diminish or discontinue their use of this data.

In adopting ***Regulation*** NMS, the Commission granted self-regulatory organizations and broker-dealers increased authority and flexibility to offer new and unique market data to the public. It was believed that this authority would expand the amount of data available to consumers, and also spur innovation and ***competition*** for the provision of market data:

[E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to receive (and pay for) such data when broker-dealers may choose to receive (and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal analysis of the need for such data. n11

n11 *See* Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), [*70 FR 37496*](https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=administrative-codes&id=urn:contentItem:4GH9-4PB0-014W-D1VJ-00000-00&context=) (June 29, 2005).

By removing "unnecessary regulatory restrictions" on the ability of exchanges to sell their own data, ***Regulation*** NMS advanced the goals of the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If the free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to broker-dealers at all, it follows that the price at which such data is sold should be set by the market as well.

In July, 2010, Congress adopted H.R. 4173, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank Act"), which amended Section 19 of the Act. Among other things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended paragraph (A) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the phrase "on any person, whether or not the person is a member of the self-regulatory organization" after "due, fee or other charge imposed by the self-regulatory organization." As a result, all SRO rule proposals establishing or changing dues, fees or other charges are immediately effective upon filing regardless of whether such dues, fees or other charges are imposed on members of the SRO, non-members, or both. Section 916 further amended paragraph (C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act to read, in pertinent part, "At any time within the 60-day period beginning on the date of filing of such a proposed rule change in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) [of Section 19(b)], the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend the change in the rules of the self-regulatory organization made thereby, if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this title. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under paragraph (2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved."

The Exchange believes that these amendments to Section 19 of the Act reflect Congress's intent to allow the Commission to rely upon the forces of ***competition*** to ensure that fees for market data are reasonable and equitably allocated. Although Section 19(b) had formerly authorized immediate effectiveness for a "due, fee or other charge imposed by the self-regulatory organization," the Commission adopted a policy and subsequently a rule stating that fees for data and other products available to persons that are not members of the self-regulatory organization must be approved by the Commission after first being published for comment. At the time, the Commission supported the adoption of the policy and the rule by pointing out that unlike members, whose representation in self-regulatory organization governance was mandated by the Act, non-members should be given the opportunity to comment on fees before being required to pay them, and that the Commission should specifically approve all such fees. The Exchange believes that the amendment to Section 19 reflects Congress's conclusion that the evolution of self-regulatory organization governance and ***competitive*** market structure have rendered the Commission's prior policy on non-member fees obsolete. Specifically, many exchanges have evolved from member-owned, not-for-profit corporations into for-profit, investor-owned corporations (or subsidiaries of investor-owned corporations). Accordingly, exchanges no longer have narrow incentives to manage their affairs for the exclusive benefit of their members, but rather have incentives to maximize the appeal of their products to all customers, whether members or non-members, so as to broaden distribution and grow revenues. Moreover, the Exchange believes that the change also reflects an endorsement of the Commission's determinations that reliance on ***competitive*** markets is an appropriate means to ensure equitable and reasonable prices. Simply put, the change reflects a presumption that all fee changes should be permitted to take effect immediately, since the level of all fees are constrained by ***competitive*** forces.

Selling proprietary market data, such as Historical Market Data, is a means by which exchanges ***compete*** to attract business. To the extent that exchanges are successful in such ***competition***, they earn trading revenues and also enhance the value of their data products by increasing the amount of data they provide. The need to ***compete*** for business places substantial pressure upon exchanges to keep their fees for both executions and data reasonable. n12 The Exchange therefore believes that the fees for Historical Market Data are properly assessed on Members and Non-Member users.

n12 *See* [*Sec. Indus. Fin. Mkts. Ass'n (SIFMA), Initial Decision Release No. 1015, 2016 SEC LEXIS 2278*](https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=administrative-materials&id=urn:contentItem:5K44-XNM0-000Y-43WY-00000-00&context=) (ALJ June 1, 2016) (finding the existence of vigorous ***competition*** with respect to non-core market data).

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in *NetCoalition* v. *SEC,* No. 09-1042 (D.C. Cir. 2010), although reviewing a Commission decision made prior to the effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the Commission's reliance upon ***competitive*** markets to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees for market data:

In fact, the legislative history indicates that the Congress intended that the market system evolve through the interplay of ***competitive*** forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power in those situations where ***competition*** may not be sufficient,' such as **[\*50183]** in the creation of a consolidated transactional reporting system.' n13

n13 *NetCoalition,* at 15 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 92 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323).

The court's conclusions about Congressional intent are therefore reinforced by the Dodd-Frank Act amendments, which create a presumption that exchange fees, including market data fees, may take effect immediately, without prior Commission approval, and that the Commission should take action to suspend a fee change and institute a proceeding to determine whether the fee change should be approved or disapproved only where the Commission has concerns that the change may not be consistent with the Act.

*B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on* ***Competition***

MIAX PEARL does not believe that the proposed rule changes will impose any burden on ***competition*** not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. Indeed, the Exchange believes that offering certain Historical Market Data will enhance ***competition*** by encouraging sales, which will make analytical data more readily available to investors. Notwithstanding its determination that the Commission may rely upon ***competition*** to establish fair and equitably allocated fees for market data, the *NetCoalition* Court found that the Commission had not, in that case, compiled a record that adequately supported its conclusion that the market for the data at issue in the case was ***competitive***. The Exchange believes that a record may readily be established to demonstrate the ***competitive*** nature of the market in question.

The market for data products is extremely ***competitive*** and users may freely choose alternative venues and data vendors based on the aggregate fees assessed, the data offered, and the value provided. Numerous exchanges ***compete*** with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself, providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish to produce and distribute their own market data. Transaction execution and proprietary data products are complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the execution fees, data quality and price, and distribution of its data products. Without trade executions, exchange data products cannot exist. Moreover, data products are valuable to many end users only insofar as they provide information that end users expect will assist them or their customers in making trading decisions.

The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, the operation of the Exchange is characterized by high fixed costs and low marginal costs. This cost structure is common in content distribution industries such as software, where developing new software typically requires a large initial investment (and continuing large investments to upgrade software), but once the software is developed, the incremental cost of providing that software to an additional user is typically small, or even zero (*e.g.,* if the software can be downloaded over the internet after being purchased). n14 In the case of any exchange, it is costly to build and maintain a trading platform, but the incremental cost of trading each additional share on an existing platform, or distributing an additional instance of data, is very low. Market information and executions are each produced jointly (in the sense that the activities of trading and placing orders are the source of the information that is distributed) and are each subject to significant scale economies.

n14 *See* William J. Baumol and Daniel G. Swanson, "The New Economy and Ubiquitous ***Competitive*** Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power," ***Antitrust*** *Law Journal,* Vol. 70, No. 3 (2003).

***Competition*** among trading platforms can be expected to constrain the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint products. The level of ***competition*** and contestability in the market is evidence in the numerous alternative venues that ***compete*** for order flow, including SRO markets, as well as internalizing BDs and various forms of alternative trading systems ("ATSs"), including dark pools and electronic communication networks ("ECNs"). Each SRO market ***competes*** to produce transaction reports via trade executions. It is common for BDs to further and exploit this ***competition*** by sending their order flow and transaction reports to multiple markets, rather than providing them all to a single market. ***Competitive*** markets for order flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of proprietary data products. The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so, including the Nasdaq exchanges, NYSE exchanges, and CBOE/Bats exchanges.

In this ***competitive*** environment, an "excessive" price for one product will have to be reflected in lower prices for other products sold by the Exchange, or otherwise the Exchange may experience a loss in sales that may adversely affect its profitability. In this case, the proposed rule change enhances ***competition*** by providing Historical Market Data at a fixed price. As such, the Exchange believes that the proposed changes will enhance, not impair, ***competition*** in the financial markets.

The market for market data products is ***competitive*** and inherently contestable because there is fierce ***competition*** for the inputs necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges ***compete*** with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself, providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in a vigorously ***competitive*** market.

Broker-dealers currently have numerous alternative venues for their order flow, including fifteen existing options markets. Each SRO market ***competes*** to produce transaction reports via trade executions. ***Competitive*** markets for order flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of proprietary data products. The large number of SROs that currently produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each SRO is currently permitted to produce proprietary data products, and many in addition to MIAX PEARL currently do, including NASDAQ, CBOE, Nasdaq ISE, NYSE American, and NYSE Arca. Additionally, order routers and market data vendors can **[\*50184]** facilitate single or multiple broker-dealers' production of proprietary data products. The potential sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless.

Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for proprietary data products because they control the primary means of access to end subscribers. Vendors impose price restraints based upon their business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to offer proprietary products that end subscribers will not purchase in sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, impose a discipline by providing only data that will enable them to attract "eyeballs" that contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail broker-dealers, such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data only if it promotes trading and generates sufficient commission revenue. Although the business models may differ, these vendors' pricing discipline is the same: They can simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data product that fails to provide sufficient value. The Exchange and other producers of proprietary data products must understand and respond to these varying business models and pricing disciplines in order to market proprietary data products successfully.

In addition to the ***competition*** and price discipline described above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable. The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. ***Regulation*** NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data, has increased the contestability of that market. While broker-dealers have previously published their proprietary data individually, ***Regulation*** NMS encourages market data vendors and broker-dealers to produce proprietary products cooperatively in a manner never before possible. Multiple market data vendors already have the capability to aggregate data and disseminate it on a profitable scale, including Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters.

The Court in *NetCoalition* concluded that the Commission had failed to demonstrate that the market for market data was ***competitive*** based on the reasoning of the Commission's *NetCoalition* order because, in the Court's view, the Commission had not adequately demonstrated that the proprietary data at issue in the case is used to attract order flow. The Exchange believes, however, that evidence not then before the court clearly demonstrates that availability of data attracts order flow. Due to ***competition*** among platforms, the Exchange intends to improve its platform data offerings on a continuing basis, and to respond promptly to customers' data needs.

The intensity of ***competition*** for proprietary information is significant and the Exchange believes that this proposal itself clearly evidences such ***competition***. The Exchange is offering Historical Market Data in order to keep pace with changes in the industry and evolving customer needs. It is entirely optional and is geared towards attracting new order flow. MIAX PEARL ***competitors*** continue to create new market data products and innovative pricing in this space. In all cases, the Exchange expects firms and other parties to make decisions on how much and what types of data to consume on the basis of the total cost of interacting with MIAX PEARL or other exchanges. Of course, the explicit data fees are only one factor in a total platform analysis. Some ***competitors*** have lower transactions fees and higher data fees, and others are vice versa. The market for this proprietary information is highly ***competitive*** and continually evolves as products develop and change.

*C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others*

Written comments were neither solicited nor received.

**III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for Commission Action**

The foregoing rule change is effective pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, n15 and subparagraph (f)(2) of Rule 19b-4 n16 thereunder, because it establishes a due, fee, or other charge imposed by the Exchange. At any time within 60 days of the filing of such proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under Section 19(b)(2)(B) n17 of the Act to determine whether the proposed rule change should be approved or disapproved.

n15 [*15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii)*](https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=statutes-legislation&id=urn:contentItem:4YF7-GTY1-NRF4-41M9-00000-00&context=).

n16 [*17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2)*](https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=administrative-codes&id=urn:contentItem:5NBM-FN20-008G-Y15M-00000-00&context=).

n17 [*15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B)*](https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=statutes-legislation&id=urn:contentItem:4YF7-GTY1-NRF4-41M9-00000-00&context=).

**IV. Solicitation of Comments**

Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

*Electronic Comments*

* Use the Commission's Internet comment form ([*http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml*](http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml)); or

1. Send an email to [*rule-comments@sec.gov*](mailto:rule-comments@sec.gov)*.* Please include File Number SR-PEARL-2017-35 on the subject line.

*Paper Comments*

* Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-PEARL-2017-35. This file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's Internet Web site ([*http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml*](http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml)). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of *5 U.S.C. 552*, will be available for Web site viewing and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-PEARL-2017-35 and should be submitted on or before November 20, 2017.

n18 [*17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12)*](https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=administrative-codes&id=urn:contentItem:5SPP-2120-008G-Y2ND-00000-00&context=). **[\*50185]**

For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.<18>

**Eduardo A. Aleman,**

*Assistant Secretary.*

[FR Doc. 2017-23480 Filed 10-27-17; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8011-01-P

FEDERAL REGISTER

**End of Document**